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Abstract	  
	  
Northern	  Ireland	  (NI)	  is	  a	  small	  region	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  with	  a	  history	  of	  
violent	  conflict	  associated	  with	  the	  national	  and	  religious	  identities	  of	  its	  
inhabitants.	  Post-­‐conflict	  societies	  face	  complex	  challenges	  in	  the	  development	  of	  
cultural	  policy,	  particularly	  where	  some	  cultural	  markers	  have	  become	  associated	  
with	  antagonism	  or	  political	  affiliation.	  This	  chapter	  will	  focus	  on	  how	  the	  social,	  
spatial,	  educational,	  religious	  and	  political	  divisions	  in	  NI	  –	  coupled	  with	  deep	  
socio-­‐economic	  deprivation	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  consensus	  –	  mean	  that	  many	  
issues	  relating	  to	  cultural	  policy	  are	  neglected.	  We	  chart	  how	  the	  history	  of	  NI	  has	  
left	  significant	  barriers	  to	  shared	  culture	  within	  NI,	  leading	  to	  inertia	  on	  policy	  in	  
relation	  to	  community	  relations	  and	  social	  cohesion.	  That	  being	  the	  case,	  we	  
show	  how	  the	  government	  Department	  of	  Culture,	  Arts	  and	  Leisure	  (DCAL),	  and	  
the	  Arts	  Council	  of	  Northern	  Ireland	  (ACNI),	  the	  main	  arm’s	  length	  body	  for	  
funding,	  have	  clear	  policies	  relating	  to	  how	  the	  arts	  and	  culture	  can	  alleviate	  
socio-­‐economic	  problems.	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Cultural Policy in Northern Ireland: making cultural policy for a divided society 
 
Phil Ramsey and Bethany Waterhouse-Bradley  
 
 
Northern Ireland (NI) is a small region of the United Kingdom with a history of 
violent conflict associated with the national and religious identities of its inhabitants. 
Post-conflict societies face complex challenges in the development of cultural policy, 
particularly where some cultural markers have become associated with antagonism or 
political affiliation. This chapter will focus on how the social, spatial, educational, 
religious and political divisions in NI – coupled with deep socio-economic 
deprivation and a lack of political consensus – mean that many issues relating to 
cultural policy are neglected. We chart how the history of NI has left significant 
barriers to shared culture within NI, leading to inertia on policy in relation to 
community relations and social cohesion. That being the case, we show how the 
government Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL), and the Arts Council 
of Northern Ireland (ACNI), the main arm’s length body for funding, have clear 
policies relating to how the arts and culture can alleviate socio-economic problems. 
This is shown in the context of how the wider political system gives a central role to 
cultural policy as a driver of economic development, seen through the work of the 
publicly funded body Northern Ireland Screen, responsible for attracting international 
film and television productions to NI through direct financial subsidisation of 
production costs. With this example we show that there is much clearer consensus on 
the economic role for culture in NI than there is in relation to the more contentious 
cultural issues relating to historic divisions. 
 
 
The Historical Context of Northern Ireland 
 
NI is a small region with a population of 1.81 million under the jurisdiction of the 
United Kingdom (UK), sharing a border with the Republic of Ireland (ROI). 
Following the partitioning of Ireland in 1921, which led to the creation of NI, there 
has been ethnic conflict between the Protestant (largely identifying as British) 
majority and the Catholic (largely identifying as Irish) minority for several decades 
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(although conflict and violence in the region dates back centuries). From the late 
1960s, NI descended into a violent political struggle known as the ‘Troubles’ which 
lasted until the 1990s in its most intense phase, and led to the deaths of more than 
3500 people in the following thirty years.. Attacks and murders that are sectarian in 
their nature, and attacks upon the police and armed forces, continue almost to the 
present day. The economic and social scars of the conflict remain, with NI rated as 
one of the most deprived regions of the UK. The divided nature of society in NI can 
be charted back across multiple centuries, although what Hennessy (1997, p.1) calls 
the “deeper roots of conflict” can be traced to the Ulster Plantation in the Seventeenth 
Century, which involved the movement of (mainly) Protestants from England and 
Scotland into the province of Ulster (which maps largely onto the present-day NI). 
This situation led to hostility between the Planters and the already-existing Catholic 
population, especially in relation to land displacement, cultural and religious 
differences (Tonge 2002, p.5).  
 
Following the 1921 establishment of NI, it was ruled by the Ulster Unionist Party (the 
then dominant political party aligned to maintaining NI’s position within the UK) 
through the NI Parliament until 1972 (Bew, Gibbon and Patterson 2002). Because the 
border of NI was drawn with the specific intent of retaining a majority population 
who identified as British and as such wished to retain the union with the Great 
Britain, cultural identity, and thus expressions of culture, became fundamental issues 
in the jurisdiction. After decades of direct rule from Westminster and several attempts 
at a political solution to the Troubles, the Belfast Agreement (1998) led to the setting 
up of a Legislative Assembly at Stormont and a devolved Executive Government to 
NI. Despite that, the NI Assembly has for some time existed in a precarious state. 
Ongoing threats to political power-sharing include: dealing with continued political 
violence, the perpetuation of the main paramilitary groupings many years after their 
ceasefires, and a failure to reach and implement agreement over a raft of cultural 
issues that include flags and symbols (Bryan 2015).  
 
It is impossible to discuss conflict, culture and identity in NI without some 
generalisation and simplification of what are invariably complex and nuanced issues. 
These foundations of these are explored in depth in Ruane and Todd (1996), Miller 
(1998), and Nic Craith (2003); a historical examination of the conflict in NI can be 
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found in Hayes and McAllister (2013) and O’Dochartaigh (2016). Within NI 
entrenched division remains: schools, residential areas, and to a certain extent sport 
and social pursuits, remain largely segregated through most of the region, the social 
and economic costs of which will be discussed later in the chapter. The following 
sections will discuss the demographic, socio-economic, and political backdrop against 
which cultural policy is developed in NI. 
 
 
Demographic and socio-economic context of NI 
 
The economy in NI is highly dependent on the public sector, and economic policy has 
been focused on emphasizing private growth, innovation and skills improvement, and 
building a more appropriate economic infrastructure (NI Executive 2012a). However, 
during a period of economic decline across Europe and the UK, NI continues to be 
one of the most affected regions economically, with a 10% drop in Gross Value 
Added (GVA) between 2008 and 2011 – the largest decrease in the UK (Nolan 2014). 
The rate of child poverty in NI in 2012–2013 was 20.5%, one of the highest in the 
UK, and is predicted to rise to 29% in 2020–2021, a rate higher than the rest of the 
country (Browne et al. 2014, pp.19–21). Unemployment and underemployment 
contribute to these problems, with almost 15% economically inactive in the 16-74 age 
group (excluding students and retired persons), 16.81% of working aged unemployed 
people having never worked and 44.98% of those in long-term unemployment 
(NISRA 2012). Poor health among those from lower socio-economic backgrounds is 
also a significant problem (DHSSPS 2011).  
 
In addition, there are myriad socio-economic problems among young people in NI, 
especially in terms of educational achievement among Protestant boys (Nolan 2014). 
Segregation in education continues to be the norm, with only 6.5% of children 
educated in integrated schools (as opposed to Protestant/Catholic schools) (Nolan 
2014). There is no sign of change in these figures, as rather than supporting the 
education of Protestant and Catholic children side by side with a uniform-curriculum, 
the Executive has opted for the encouragement of shared schools, where students 
share campus resources while retaining separate teaching and learning (OFMDFM 
2010). Finally, space and territory in NI remain substantially segregated, and while 
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there has been a significant decrease in ‘single identity wards’ across the region from 
55% to 37% (wards where more than 80% of residents identify with a single 
community), at a micro level in many areas segregation still persists (Shuttleworth 
and Lloyd 2013). In spite of a period of sustained relative peace in the region and a 
clear shift towards moving away from self-identification as one side or the other, 
public attitudes reflect a pessimistic view of the future of good relations (McDermott 
2014). As we discuss below, opposing politicians more readily find consensus around 
economic issues than they do cultural issues, which often leads to policy inertia. 
 
 
Northern Ireland and the politicisation of culture 
 
In this section we advance a discussion of the politicisation of culture within NI, and 
discuss how the notion of a national cultural policy frame of reference is instead 
undermined by a ‘bipolar’ notion of culture in NI. NI stands alongside a number of 
other countries and regions where “ethnic and cultural diversity” (Saukkonen and 
Pyykkönen 2008) necessitates the management of cultural policy accordingly, such as 
France (Kiwan 2007), the Netherlands (Delhaye and van de Ven 2014) and Catalonia 
(Barbieri 2012, p.17). Outside of Europe, there is some relevance to NI of the case of 
cultural policy in Canada, which has long been required to balance linguistic 
diversity, in addition to ethnic diversity in its cultural policy (Rabinovitch 2007). In 
NI culture is often defined within the public sphere, policy development and 
implementation in a narrow manner. While the reasons for this are myriad, the 
primary issues are political and historical in their origin (see Nic Craith, 2003).  
 
One prominent issue within cultural policy in NI is the lack of a national cultural 
policy frame of reference (Ahearne 2011, p.155), the like of which can “provide a 
means of reconciling contending cultural identities by holding up the nation as an 
essence that transcends particular interests” (Miller and Yudice 2002, p.8). Were a 
policy official or politician attempting to evoke the nation within their approach, they 
would not have this as an option available to them, or rather would not have it if they 
were attempting to achieve consensus within the political and cultural sphere. (Later, 
one of the first attempts by a government department to construct a national cultural 
policy for NI will be discussed.) Rather, as we have seen, with marked heterogeneous 
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national identities being identified by NI’s population, cultural policy that seeks to 
reflect a “distinctive cultural identity” (Mulcahy 1998, p.249) immediately alienates 
almost half of the population.  
 
Moreover, viewing NI through what might be termed the ‘bipolar’ notion of culture 
(Graham and Nash 2006), or the ‘two community straitjacket’ (Feldman et al. 2005), 
a cultural paradigm seen in the assumption of many politicians, major media outlets, 
and public policy suggests the majority of people in the region can be neatly divided 
into these classifications. This notion is challenged through the most recent census 
data, which points to a marked change in self-identification of nationality and 
ethnicity, with 29.35% of respondents taking on the moniker of ‘Northern Irish’, 
eschewing more ‘traditional’ identification as either British, 48.41% or Irish, 28.35% 
(NISRA 2012). Also increasing is the number of respondents from national and ethnic 
backgrounds (4%) falling outside British, Irish, and Northern Irish, as increasing 
migration and the associated increase in births to foreign-born mothers begin to be 
reflected in demographic figures (NISRA 2012).  
 
The so-called two-community straitjacket is particularly difficult for those from 
minority cultures, where race and ethnicity is seen as ‘an extension’ of sectarian 
divisions (Graham and Nash 2006). The creation of cultural identity allied to 
citizenship, religion and or nationality is already problematic within NI, but it is 
further problematised when other groups are considered, leaving as it does very little 
space for layered perceptions of personal identity. Demographic changes, however, 
are visibly absent or disproportionately attended to by community cohesion and 
cultural policy. In the next section we discuss the theory of cultural citizenship in 
relation to NI, and discuss culture that is consumed by the overall population which 
tends to be less politicised and shared. We then turn to a discussion of ‘traditional’ 
culture in NI, the culture often attached to contested practices and those which are 
often politicised as a means of identifying oneself as one group or differentiating from 
the ‘other’. We focus here on sport, music and language. 
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Cultural citizenship and cultural practices 
 
We can develop this theme by considering the concept of cultural citizenship 
(Stevenson 2003). When considering the implications of this theory for NI, we first 
see first that citizenship as a foundational process is disrupted. For example, O’Brien 
(2010, p.600) argues that an understanding of citizenship “in the sense that citizens 
accept the right of other individuals to be citizens” has “never existed in Northern 
Ireland due to differences in allegiances”. Thus, to take Stevenson’s authoritative 
quotation on cultural citizenship, we see that such a concept travels very poorly to NI: 
 
 Cultural citizenship therefore is the struggle for a democratic society 
 that enables a diversity of citizens to lead relatively meaningful lives, 
 that respects the formation of complex hybrid identities, offers them the 
 protection of the social state and grants them the access to a critical 
 education that seeks to explore the possibility of living in a future free 
 from domination and oppression. (Stevenson 2010, p.289). 
 
In some regards, Stevenson’s conception can be seen to be realisable within NI 
society, where for example the social state is considered. However, for Stevenson 
“Only when public spaces become participatory and democratic spaces can we say 
that the project for an autonomous society has come to fruition” (Stevenson 2010, 
p.276).  
 
Far from that being the case in NI physical markers of cultural identity are signifiers 
of territory, and used as a way of creating internal cohesion while ‘othering’ outsiders. 
Many of NI’s public spaces are contested and segregated (Shirlow and Murtagh 
2006), used for commemoration activities that divide (McDowell, Braniff and 
Murphy 2015) and marked out by the flying of flags that evoke other conflict areas, 
such as Israeli and Palestinian flags (Hill and White 2008). Moreover, this co-optation 
of cultural identity for the purpose of marking territory is extended to government 
departments, where placement of ministers in certain spaces to ensure dominance of a 
political perspective in that space is clear (Sinn Féin and DUP always look to the 
Departments of Culture, Arts and Leisure, and Education – areas where there is strong 
sense of using culture as a marker in the middle classes).  
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That said, much cultural consumption in NI, at the level of popular culture, is largely 
shared between the two main communities rather than divided. As such, much 
popular culture is globalised in its nature (Drache and Froese 2006), with areas such 
as film, music and fashion and being akin to the picture across Europe, and indeed 
much of the rest of the developed world. The broadcasting system in NI is dominated 
by that of the UK (Ofcom 2015, Ramsey 2015), leading to strong British cultural 
influences especially in terms of television drama, and in radio, in addition to that 
which is produced locally in NI (Moore 2003). In many of these areas there is often 
no discernable differences between members of the two main religious-political 
communities, while culture broadly construed is shaped by aspects of ‘British culture’ 
(see numerous entries on NI in Childs and Storry 1999) and ‘Irish culture’, though as 
O’Malley (2011, p.159) notes “Irish culture is deeply entwined with that of Britain” 
and thus the two are more difficult to demarcate. 
  
Sport 
Culture becomes more divided along community lines when the areas of sport and 
cultural identity are concerned, with sport an area which is greatly divided along 
religious lines (Hassan 2005). In NI participation in playing and watching rugby 
union and cricket are dominated by those identifying or brought up as Protestant; 
those identifying or brought up as Catholic make up an almost exclusive grouping in 
participating in playing and watching the historic Gaelic Games, under the auspices of 
the Gaelic Athletic Association (Burgess 2015a, p.107). While these sports are mainly 
linked to each community, the wearing of sporting apparel has caused tensions in the 
past, and is banned from certain public places (though this is not exceptional to NI). 
Soccer is one game which is played by and has spectators from both Protestant and 
Catholic communities (Hassan 2002), although the teams in the premier division of 
soccer in NI are supported almost exclusively by Protestants (eg. Linfield F.C.) or 
Catholics (eg. Cliftonville F.C.). It is the most contested sport in terms of clashes 
between fans of teams from opposing communities, and many sporting fixtures are 
heavily policed for this reason. In addition, support for the national soccer team – 
Northern Ireland – has been traditionally linked to Protestants, though there have been 
significant efforts in recent years by the governing body to make international 
matches more accessible (Hargie, Somerville and Mitchell 2015). In other areas of 
cultural identity and traditions we can see strong demarcations along community lines 
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(Nic Craith 2003). Space does not allow for a full examination of a range of topics 
that could be usefully surveyed, and so we choose to focus on music – which “for 
several centuries … has been used as a primary means of encoding ‘party’ and 
religious affiliations” (Cooper 2010, p. 94) – and language, as two key sites for 
cultural contestation. 
 
Music 
Music in NI has the potential to be evocative in nature by virtue of its relationship to 
historical conflict. Among Protestants, for example, there is a strong musical tradition 
which accompanies Orange Order events. The most notable example is that of the 
commemoration of the Battle of the Boyne – a significant historical marker for 
Unionists which is symbolic of victory over a Catholic monarch. Each 12 July King 
William III’s victory over King James II in 1690 (Tong 2002, p.4–5) has traditionally 
been commemorated by those brought-up as Protestants, especially in rural areas. 
Implicit in this is the tradition that members of the Orange Order parade with 
marching bands, replete with fifes and ‘Lambeg’ drums (Cooper 2010, p.94), which 
causes significant tensions in some areas (Bryan and Jarman 1997, Bryan 2015). 
Accordingly, the Parades Commission is an independent public body set up in 1998 to 
reach determinations on which public parades can receive approval, and can issue 
conditions for how they must be conducted.  
 
In recent years there have been attempts to open up Orangeism to a wider audience, 
and through the introduction of Orangefest to make it more culturally relevant 
(Kennaway 2015). That said, such cultural expressions generally play quite poorly on 
the European and global cultural stage, no doubt contributing to a sense that Ulster 
loyalists, one group associated with Orangeism, are “the least fashionable community 
in Western Europe” (McDonald as cited in Burgess 2015b, p.xii). Among those 
brought-up Catholic, there are firm Gaelic traditions, especially in relation to Irish 
traditional music – itself with clear musical connections to Scottish traditional music 
(Cooper 2009, p.65). The annual traditional music festival Fleadh Cheoil na hEireann 
is a massive event that attracts over 400,000 people (McLaughlin 2013), remarkable 
given that the all-island population of Ireland is just ~6.4 million people 
(CSO/NISRA 2014).  
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Language 
The use of the Irish language is linked mainly to the Catholic-Nationalist community, 
from which the vast majority of its speakers are located in terms of expressed national 
identity. McMonagle (2010, p.255) argues that “Irish has come to be associated with 
nationalist/ republican identities”, or for Pritchard (2004, p.62), the language is “an 
important basis of Irish nationalism”. Often, this had not just been the ‘fault’ of one 
side or the other, but about how language – both Irish and Ulster-Scots – has been 
used as political tools in the so-called ‘culture wars’ (Nolan 2014, pp.154–162). 
However, the politicisation of the Irish language has occurred in a manner that is 
extremely reductionist when viewed historically. For example, Protestants “have 
made an important historical cultural contribution to the preservation and 
development of the Irish language” (Pritchard 2004, p.75) with Presbyterians in 
particular playing their part. Today, the Irish language has been ‘rediscovered’ among 
very small pockets among the Protestant-Unionist population. However, as we discuss 
below, issues in relation to language remain deeply contested at the policy level, with 
a continued failure among NI’s politicians to find an agreeable role for Irish within 
Northern Irish public life.  
 
 
The Legal and Political Context for Cultural Policy in NI 	  
Under the New Labour government (1997–2010), powers were initially devolved to 
the Scotland, NI and Wales through the Scotland Act (1998), the Northern Ireland Act 
(1998), and the Government of Wales Act (1998) respectively. Each of these 
legislatures have different sets of responsibilities (in the case of Scotland, a 
Parliament and a Government), and different reserved and devolved matters (Trench 
2007). NI had a period of devolved government prior to this from 1922–1972, but the 
NI Parliament became untenable after increasing ethnic conflict between Protestant 
and Catholic communities in the region and NI underwent a lengthy period of direct 
rule from Westminster (McQuade and Fagan 2002). When devolution was established 
as part of the Belfast Agreement in 1998, it was a means of establishing the 
institutions through which conflict resolution could be achieved (Holloway, 2005). 
Shortly after devolution was established in 1998, there was another suspension of the 
local Assembly due to disagreements between the main political parties (2002–2007). 
11 
 
The most recent incarnation of devolution in NI is still in its early stages – at the time 
of writing the Assembly is in its third term of a mandatory coalition government – and 
the Executive is currently led by two diametrically opposed political parties: Sinn 
Féin, the major Irish Nationalist party, and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the 
major British Unionist party. 
 
The first NI Assembly after the Northern Ireland Act 1998 was elected in June 1998. 
Led by a First Minister and Deputy First Minister, it was supported by 10 ministries 
allocated proportionally across political parties (Knox, 1999). The Assembly was 
based on a consociational model of governance – a model particularly designed for 
the management of post-conflict governance which seeks to find a balance between 
the two conflicting communities and preserve the different identities (McGarry and 
O’Leary 2006, Graham and Nash 2006). However the manner in which the executive 
is constructed entrenches sectarian division and normalises it in the political sphere 
(Graham and Nash 2006). This division has the potential to lead to inhibited decision-
making and delays in the policy process, with the failure to progress the proposed 
Irish Language Act that we discuss below a notable example. This delay in particular 
has resulted in international condemnation from the Council of Europe due to failure 
to comply with the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, and is 
perceived to be a direct result of divisions between the DUP and Sinn Féin, as well as 
a result of the politicisation of the Irish Language in the region (Meredith 2014). This 
section will outline some of the key cultural frameworks in the devolved Assembly, 
as well as providing insight into how political differences play out in the development 
of cultural policy. 
 
The proposed Irish Language Act 
The statutory requirements to promote and protect the Irish language are embedded in 
regional legislation and international charters, and the commitment to the production 
of Irish Language legislation was a condition of the St. Andrews Agreement in 2006 – 
which outlines the conditions for the main parties to re-enter power sharing at the 
local Assembly after a period of direct rule (NIHRC 2010). The UK is a signatory to 
the Council of Europe Framework Convention for National Minorities and the 
European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (1992) which came into force 
in 1998. Nation states choose what languages they register and under which 
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jurisdiction it will be accountable. The European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages outlines a commitment to positive, proactive duties on minority language 
rights, and is legally binding under European Law (NIHRC 2010). Irish and Ulster-
Scots are both registered for the region of NI, however the region has failed to 
produce evidence submissions to the monitoring reports in the past two rounds due to 
failure to reach consensus on the submission (Council of Europe 2013).  
 
The proposal for an Irish Language Act, under a Sinn Féin-led Department of Culture, 
Arts and Leisure, is the NI Assembly’s attempt at developing the Irish language 
legislation promised by the St. Andrews Agreement, and calls for the following 
actions (among others): to have Irish defined as an official language; the right to use 
Irish in courts, tribunals and other legal settings; parity for use of Irish in the NI 
Assembly; the promotion of Irish in public bodies, including affirmative action for 
Irish speakers; Irish language schemes in public bodies; parity of English and Irish on 
road signage and place names; and a guaranteed right to education in Irish (DCAL 
2015a). However there has been strong and consistent resistance from the DUP and 
other Unionist politicians, with claims ranging from economic wastefulness in times 
of austerity, to Sinn Féin political posturing, to deliberate removal of ‘Britishness’ 
from NI (The Newsletter, 10.02.15). The argument around the Irish language is 
another example of the application of zero-sum politics in the region, where rather 
than being treated like a minority language, Irish is instead treated as a political 
symbol or emblem and as such is a threat to the ‘other side’ of the political 
community (NIHRC 2010). 
 
Good Relations and the Social Cohesion 
There is a legislative imperative set out by the Belfast Agreement which requires 
statutory agencies to address issues of equality and good relations. In spite of this 
imperative, there has been little documented long-term success of community 
relations. The Harbison Review of Community Relations Policy (2002) found that 
there had been no substantive change in decreasing division “as measured by greater 
integration of housing and education” (as cited in Graham and Nash 2006). Measuring 
the success of community relations policy based on public attitudes, Morrow et al. 
(2013) found that while there are some reasons for optimism, segregation remains 
significant and individuals are still sceptical about the possibility of sustained peace 
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and integration. Good relations policy in NI has very rarely been proactive in creating 
shared space (regardless of the implied language), but rather on creating neutral space 
to share, and maintaining the rights to separate but equal space elsewhere. The first 
attempt at social cohesion policy post-conflict, A Shared Future (OFMDFM 2005), 
was imperfect in its response, but attempted to address the issue of shared space. It 
placed some emphasis on putting integration in the foreground, and fostering trust and 
interdependence. The document was not implemented, and was ignored in the 
Programme for Government by the Sinn Féin and DUP led Assembly which took over 
from the Direct Rule authors of the document. It was followed by the proposed 
Cohesion Sharing and Integration, which was again scrapped after a highly critical 
reception from both the public respondents to the consultation and other political 
leadership (Nolan 2014).  
 
Without public consultation, or the involvement of their partners in government – the 
Ulster Unionist Party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party, and Alliance – the 
Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (in the NI Executive) produced 
Together: Building a United Community (TBUC) in 2013.  The document, which 
focuses on children and young people, a shared community, a safe community, and 
cultural expression (OFMDFM 2013), provides little in the way of new developments 
in good relations and community cohesion, and did not have overt support from 
within government outside of the two main parties (Nolan 2014). TBUC follows 
previous policies in the expression of what Dixon (2002) refers to as ‘constructive 
ambiguity’ of good relations policy which allow for them to be interpreted however 
the audience sees fit. This is not restricted to post-conflict societies, but is part of the 
wider notion of status quo policy making, where this ambiguity can be used to 
seemingly address relevant concerns without commitment to one or another 
ideological stance. There is a policy of avoidance in addition to the idea of ambiguity 
in cultural policy – where discussions of history are often excluded, as is the 
aspiration for a united Ireland, a regular criticism of Sinn Féin in other policies (Nolan 
2014). Constructive ambiguity therefore becomes both a contributor to and a product 
of consociational governance. To illustrate some of the policy inertia referred to 
throughout the chapter, we turn to a more-detailed examination of some current 
cultural policy in NI by addressing the work of the aforementioned DCAL 
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(Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure) and ACNI (Arts Council of Northern 
Ireland). 
 
 
The Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure and the Arts Council of Northern 
Ireland 
 
The government department in the NI Executive with responsibility for many areas of 
cultural policy is DCAL, which has legislative powers for cultural policy issues such 
as museums, libraries, the arts and language issues. However, not all areas in relation 
to culture are devolved, with broadcasting policy reserved to Westminster (Ramsey 
2015) (1). The current minister is Carál Ní Chuilín MLA of Sinn Féin, who has been 
in post since 2011. DCAL had a budget in 2015–2016 of £91.7 million, which had 
been reduced by 8% since the previous year (DCAL 2015b). The largest budget item 
at the department is spending on libraries (£29.4m, 32% of its 2015–16 spending) 
(DCAL 2015b, p.20). Much of the department’s work – like its counterpart the 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport in Westminster – is carried out by a number 
of arm’s length agencies that include the delivery of the aforementioned library 
spending through Libraries NI, National Museums Northern Ireland and Sport 
Northern Ireland (DCAL 2011).  
 
In terms of DCAL’s policy approach, there are two main areas on which the 
department is focused: economic development; and equality and social inclusion. This 
is clear in its key objectives: 
 
1. To ensure that culture, arts and leisure activities positively impact on 
promoting equality, and tackling poverty and social exclusion 
2.  To ensure that culture, arts and leisure contribute to the growth of the 
economy and building a united community. (DCAL 2015b, p.7) 
Taken collectively, we can first see the policy approach of DCAL is towards equality 
and social inclusion as underpinned by economic development. The first of five of 
DCAL’s strategic pillars has been focusing on how the arts can help to ‘rebalance’ 
the economy, stemming from a long held notion that the NI economy is too dependent 
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on the public sector. This is followed by the fifth pillar, which is “social inclusion and 
equality” (DCAL 2011, p.16). In its corporate plan, the department identifies the 
results that it expects within the year 2015–16 on these matters, through the utilisation 
of the Promoting Equality, Tackling Poverty and Social Exclusion framework. Here 
for example, the department’s target is to “increase the proportion of people in the 
20% most deprived areas who engage in the arts to 79%” and to “increase the 
proportion of people in the 20% most deprived areas participating in sport to increase 
to 50%” (DCAL 2015b, p.14). In terms of its targets for economic development, it 
focuses on ongoing and planned redevelopment at Windsor Park and Casement Park, 
NI’s main stadia for soccer and GAA respectively.  
 
The aforementioned lack of an overarching national cultural policy for NI has been 
tentatively addressed by a DCAL draft strategy (DCAL 2015c), which had just 
completed its consultation period at the time of writing. The draft strategy maintains 
the themes of equality promotion, and alleviation of poverty and social exclusion. As 
one its five themes, Creativity and Skills places an emphasis on the contribution of 
arts and culture to the economy, a theme which is discussed in more detail below. The 
draft strategy attempts to fit within current government programmes under the NI 
Executive, with a cross-departmental approach. However, the draft strategy is very 
light on detail, particularly in terms of implementation. Indeed, for a policy which 
strives for innovation, it has a strikingly similar vision statement to the department’s 
existing ‘key objectives’ discussed above. In this version, the vision is: “To promote, 
develop and support the crucial role of arts and culture in creating a cohesive 
community and delivering social change to our society on the basis of equality for 
everyone” (DCAL 2015c, p.11). 
 
In an arts and cultural sector heavily dependent on public funding, major financial 
cuts have a substantial impact on many organisations important for the sustenance of 
diverse sector. To mitigate cuts across government departments in the Assembly, 
DCAL significantly reduced funding to ACNI, the main arm’s length body working in 
the arts in 2015–16 (ACNI 2015, p.18, Meridith 2015a). These cuts were set to be 
passed on to many of the organisations in receipt of ACNI funding, such as the Grand 
Opera House Belfast, the MAC and the Ulster Orchestra (Meridith 2015b). In terms 
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of its direct funding of outside organisations, ACNI is responsible for distributing 
funds to community organisations, many of which are tied almost exclusively to one 
side of the ethno-politico-religious divide or the other, such as in the funding of 
marching bands that represent narrow community groupings (Nolan 2012). At the 
time of writing, it is unclear what the long term impacts of austerity will be on the arts 
sector, but one can infer that it will have knock-on effects for cultural policy and good 
relations, given the inextricable links between policy and society, as outlined in this 
chapter thus far. 
 
ACNI’s policy approach, like DCAL’s, is marked by an emphasis on fostering social 
inclusion within the arts. For example, it reported that in the period 2010–2013 that 
74% of its funding had “gone directly into the most deprived areas” (ACNI 2013, 
p.7). Moreover, through its Arts and Older People Strategy it conducted programmes 
with the aim of ensuring older people in NI were not cut off from the arts, a 
programme underpinned by principles that were recognisably social democratic 
(Ramsey 2013). As part of its current five-year plan, the ACNI planned to “increase 
the proportion of arts activities delivered to the top 20% of the most deprived Super 
Output Areas” (ACNI 2013, p.14). Despite such an approach, the ACNI has reported 
during this five year cycle that “Arts engagement rates for the least deprived group 
was 86%, falling to 70% for the most deprived group” (ACNI 2014, p.3), and thus 
much work remains to be done in this area.  
 
ACNI’s Intercultural Arts Strategy 2011–2016 (ACNI 2011) acknowledges that NI 
society had become more markedly ethnically diverse in the ten or so years leading up 
to that point. Accordingly, it set out that ACNI ought to “seek to foster the expression 
of cultural pluralism; build dialogue and promote understanding, through interchanges 
within and between communities and their cultures” (ACNI 2011, p.10). In the detail 
of the strategy, it set out six ‘strategic themes’ that included Using the Arts to develop 
Community Cohesion; Using the Arts to develop Good Relations; Using the Arts as a 
vehicle to Tackle Racism (ACNI 2011, p. p.67). Finally, and akin to DCAL, ACNI is 
also concerned with economic growth, where it argues “Stimulating the growth and 
development of our creative sector will optimize our economic potential and increase 
our competitiveness” (ACNI 2014, p.7). The ACNI also has responsibility for the 
NI’s Creative Industries Innovation Fund, which takes us to the second point, where 
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cultural policy is seen in the service of economic development, a path which closely 
follows the wider UK model (eg. DCMS 2008).  
 
 
Cultural policy as a driver of economic development 
 
The creative industries (CIs) in NI have assumed a similar place in political-economy 
as is the case in the wider UK, where successive governments have both sought to 
stimulate and measure the sectors (DCMS 2001, 2011.). Statistics for the CIs are 
measured in the same manner as the rest of the UK, and their contribution to the 
economy highlighted by government departments. The most recent figures available 
at the time of writing show that the CIs comprised 3.9% of NI’s GVA in 2014, an 
11.7% increase since the previous year (DCAL 2015d, p.5). Compared with a national 
GVA of 5.2%, the NI rating is remarkably high given the weak NI economy, 
highlighted above. At the forefront of this development has been NI Screen, which 
has a key economic role to play in the development of the film and television 
industries. In place since 1997, it took over from the NI Film Council (NI Screen 
2015a).  
 
Northern Ireland Screen 
The NI Screen approach to investing directly in productions, and seeing the economic 
benefits returned, correlates directly with that of its core funder Invest NI. Invest NI is 
a publicly funded body, which provides grants to international companies to locate in 
NI, and for regional companies to invest and expand with the aim of stimulating a 
private sector which was greatly suppressed by the Troubles. Seen in its two most 
recent strategies, in Driving Global Growth (NI Screen 2010) and Opening Doors (NI 
Screen 2014), NI Screen argues for the value for economic return on investment, 
alongside a role in education and the development of a skills base with the television 
and film industries. The sector grew from being mainly involved with production for 
local television networks to an industry competing internationally for major 
productions, the best known of which is HBO’s Game of Thrones (GOT) (2011–
present) which has filmed six series of the show predominantly in NI at the time of 
writing (NI Screen 2015a).  
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NI Screen provides direct funding for productions, with a limit of £800,000, “up to a 
ceiling of 25% of the overall project budget” (NI Screen 2015b). For those companies 
choosing to film in NI, the UK’s tax relief schemes apply, where companies can claim 
a maximum of 25% relief on qualifying expenditure, either under the UK Film Tax 
Relief (BFI 2015a) or under the UK High-end TV Tax Relief (BFI 2015b), with 
various caveats. The Northern Ireland Screen Fund, had budgeted resources of 
£15.89m between 2010–2014, while NI Screen’s Opening Doors strategy has 
budgeted £36.3m between 2014–2018 (NI Screen 2014, p.84). Much of this spending 
has gone, and will continue to go on GOT production (though NI Screen notes that it 
was able to reduce GOT funding from £3.2m to £1.6m when the UK tax relief was 
introduced) (NI Screen 2014, p.38) with an anticipated return of £136m by the end of 
2018 with an 11.25 ratio between cost and return (NI Screen 2014, p.48). To date, NI 
Screen “has invested £12.45m in the series … For that investment, it is estimated that 
£110.7m has been spent on goods and services in the Northern Ireland economy” 
(Meridith 2015c). 
 
The Irish Language Broadcast Fund and the Ulster-Scots Broadcast Fund 
NI Screen also administers the Irish Language Broadcast Fund (£3m in 2015–16) and 
the Ulster-Scots Broadcast Fund (£1m in 2015–16). Both funds are available for 
production companies to apply to for the support production costs for the delivery of 
broadcasting in the Irish language, and on Ulster-Scots themes, and aim to support 55 
hours of Irish programming and 12 hours of Ulster-Scots programming in 2015–16 
(NI Screen, 2015c). Broadcasters who have utilised content supported from these 
funds include the BBC, RTÉ, TG4 and UTV (Ofcom 2014, p.29), with a supposed 
direct relationship between the public funding and spending in the broadcasting 
sector. 
 
The Belfast Agreement had provided impetus for such an initiative, though only in 
relation to Irish (NIO 1998, Section 6, Paragraph 4), and not also to Ulster-Scots 
(Ulster-Scots was solely mentioned in the context of it being “part of the cultural 
wealth of the island of Ireland” (NIO 1998, Section 6, Paragraph 3)). Little (2004) 
observes that Irish language was prioritised over Ulster-Scots in the GFA, and that the 
latter has always enjoyed a slightly tenuous position in NI. He argued that “making a 
special case for Irish language does not breach the general intentions of the 
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Agreement given that Irish language is not, in itself, disrespectful towards the culture 
of other groups” (Little 2004, p.17). This differentiation is also marked in the UK’s 
commitments to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, where 
Ulster-Scots is listed only under category II, focused on the principle of protection in 
general and Irish is listed under parts II and III, which dictates specific measures to be 
undertaken in statutory agencies (NIHRC 2010).  
 
 
Discussion 
 
Following our previous discussion of cultural citizenship, we now return to this theme 
as a means of further exploring the contested nature of cultural policy in NI. Rather 
than cultural citizenship taking form – in the Stevenson mould that we discussed 
above – the equation of citizenship with cultural identity in NI (on both sides) in ways 
that are binary and oppositional, perpetuates the politicisation of culture at every level 
(Graham and Nash 2006). This brings us to some key cultural policy questions for NI: 
is it possible to implement a pluralist cultural policy, one where the concept of 
cultural citizenship might take root, when culture and territory are inextricably linked, 
and where territory remains entrenched and divided as contested space (Hughes et al. 
2005)? What would such a ‘Northern Irish’ cultural policy look like, taking account 
both of the past, and of the changing nature of NI society with increased immigration? 
Such an endpoint is so distant under the current paradigm as to seem almost 
unimaginable, and as we have seen, the recent DCAL attempt falls somewhat short.  
 
Whenever ‘culture’ is evoked in NI, in policy or in discourse, there is division to be 
found. Graham and Nash’s (2006) point that the language of culture has been co-
opted as a means to justify or classify division is relevant here, further underlining 
how much work would be required: “In Northern Ireland, the attempt to deal with 
sub-state patterns of ethno-sectarian antagonism though principles of parity of cultural 
respect and esteem has inadvertently created a legitimating vocabulary of ‘culture’ 
and ‘cultural rights’ for antagonistic expressions of separatist difference” (Graham 
and Nash 2006, p.258). That said, the work of DCAL under Sinn Féin has often been 
rather oddly non-political at the level of party politics, apart from say the proposal for 
an Irish Language Act. While the emphasis on social exclusion and equality is 
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stronger than may be the case from the main Right and Centre-Right Unionist parties, 
examples of where ire has been drawn from Unionist parties has sometimes been 
found elsewhere (eg. the February 2016 publication of a book about the Republican 
Bobby Sands, part funded by ACNI (BBC 2016)). Herein lies one particular issue in 
relation to the formation of cultural policy. Due to the consociational nature of the NI 
Assembly, as discussed above, and the nature of a power-sharing Executive, DCAL 
often fails to take on any real kind of political direction as shaped by the Party with 
that Ministerial responsibility.  
 
While DCAL is now under the control of Sinn Féin, it was previously under DUP 
control. There are some differences in the discourse used by these Parties – eg. “in 
this part of Ireland”, used by DCAL under Sinn Féin in the department’s mission 
statement (DCAL 2015b), as opposed to using the term ‘Northern Ireland’ – however 
it is less of a politicised department than might be assumed given the myriad cultural 
issues we have considered here. Indeed political differences at DCAL, depending on 
which party controls it, are not discernible in the same way that they would be in 
relation to DCMS either under the control of Labour or the Conservative parties in the 
UK. As the parties in the NI Executive are tied into the Programme for Government 
(NI Executive 2012b), the work of individual departments cannot deviate far from the 
collectively agreed policy positions. It is worth noting, however, that these priorities 
are inherently impacted by party divisions given that they must be approved by both 
Sinn Féin and DUP, who are the two main parties in the Executive, and hold the 
current powers for the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. 
 
Rather, the policy approach of DCAL has been more in keeping with Bonet and 
Négrier’s (2011, p.578) notion that the dominant cultural policy trend since 1980 has 
been one of “economic and cultural development”. In addition to its work on socio-
economic matters, the DCAL’s approach here mirrors that of where the NI Executive 
has arguably found its clearest shared ground, that of economic development driven 
by inward investment, and actualised in the built environment as the hegemonic 
political-economic vision for NI. This is shown in its work in supporting NI Screen, 
and its apparent dedication to GOT as a driver of economic growth through jobs 
creation and tourism transcends community divide. In some ways this is unsurprising, 
with consensus over job creation perhaps more easily reached as compared to some of 
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the more contentious issues. However, the unquestioning nature of some of the 
economic assumptions are made in relation to investment and growth exposes the 
depth at which the neoliberal paradigm has become engrained. 
 
While government departments in NI are required to take delicate steps over territory 
and space when it comes to political and social issues, the economic imperative for NI 
Screen with the blessing of the NI Executive seemingly trumps all other concerns. In 
this understanding, NI’s space is ‘ripe’ for development, with the attendant 
picturesque vistas ready to be exploited by global television businesses. Attracting 
HBO to NI has spurred growth in the tourism sector, with fans travelling to numerous 
filming locations around NI (eg. Boland 2014). Further attention was drawn to the 
filming in NI by visits by Queen Elizabeth II in 2014 and the British Prime Minister 
David Cameron in 2015. Such examples are then used by the supporting politicians to 
further justify support for the film and television sector. However, the work that NI 
Screen does and the excitement generated by GOT’s filming in NI means that the 
enterprise has escaped with almost no criticism or detailed scrutiny over its operation, 
either from journalistic or academic sources. A dearth of analysis has meant that very 
little has been said about the precarious nature of HBO’s relationship with NI, the 
ethics of providing public funding to a global-national on the scale of HBO 
(ultimately owned by its parent-company Time-Warner), the nature of the 
employment it creates – often employing workers on short-term contracts – or indeed 
on the impact on the environment (2). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
NI remains very much shaped by the events of its past, in terms of cultural identity, 
and in the division of society and the socio-economic conditions which often lag 
considerably behind the rest of the UK. NI’s political institutions, while they remain 
based on consociational principles, are often found to be inadequate to deal with key 
cultural policy questions due to a lack of consensus. The agreement between the main 
parties, that using publicly-funded agencies to attract investment into NI, especially in 
the area of the creative industries, has led to NI becoming a somewhat unlikely 
leading site outside of London in film and television production. However, pointing to 
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the cultural policy ‘success stories’ cannot mask what are deep-rooted problems, 
further underlined by wider divisions within NI society. Cultural policy could 
contribute to a more-shared future in NI, but what are at times seemingly intractable 
cultural problems remain as significant obstacles to be surmounted. Future research 
on the subject is required to further develop a theory of cultural policy in NI – the 
current literature specific to the subject is limited – to further understand the role of 
culture in the context of political, economic and social progress in the region. To this 
end, more empirical work that deals with arts and cultural institutions is required, 
along with the further policy analysis that will be required when DCAL transitions 
into its new departmental context. 
 
Notes 
(1)  In January 2015 it was proposed that the work of DCAL could be 
 amalgamated with that of two other government departments in a new 
 department, the Department of Social Welfare, Communities and Sport 
 (Gordon 2015). This later simply became the Department for Communities. 
(2)  Thanks to Steve Baker for drawing our attention to this point about the 
 environmental impact. 
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